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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the manner in which the introduction of the MMP electoral system 
contained in the Electoral Act 1993 will alter the operation of select committees when the 
consider Bills. In particular, the paper examines the contention that MMP will allow select 
committees to operate in a more independent manner than at present and as a consequence 
be more politically effective. It pays particular attention to the current relationship between 
the members of committees and the caucuses and their respective parties as well as the 
formal rules which control the operation of committees. The main argument developed in 
this paper is that while committees may be able to exercise greater independence from the 
Government under MMP, the members of the committees will not be free from the 
requirements of party loyalty. The dictates of party cohesion will inevitably require 
committee members to take party positions over positions they themselves have developed . 
This will tend to limit the effectiveness of select committees, when considered as groups of 
MPs, under MMP. Further, for the political system to operate effectively, MMP requires 
that parties enter into agreements. This requirement applies particularly strongly to the 
passage of legislation. This paper argues that it is not at all clear that select committees are 
the appropriate forum for the political bargains and compromises needed for inter-party 
agreements on the passage of legislation. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, abstract, footnotes , and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 15,000 words. 
INTRODUCTION 
The commencement of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral system (MMP) will see 
great changes to the way the House of Representatives, and its constituent parts, carry out 
their functions. Parliamentary select committees, as one of the most important institutions 
of the House, will not be immune from these changes. This will be true of both their inquiry 
role and the function they perform scrutinising legislation. While those changes will be 
significant, it is doubtful that they will alter the basic relationship between select 
committees and the House. This suggests that the process of scrutinising legislation by 
select committees will not undergo tremendous modification with the introduction of MMP. 
It also suggests that select committees, when they consider legislation, will remain creatures 
of Parliament and, more particularly, creatures of political parties. Committees under MMP, 
as now, will possess a circumscribed discretion to make changes to the legislation they 
consider. Indeed, under MMP the scope of their delegated authority may even be less. MMP 
will see a power transfer from a single governing party to a number of parties in the House; 
but it will not to any significant extent transfer power from parties to the floor of the House. 
Because it will not do so, effective political power will not devolve to committees. 1 
At its most basic, the change in electoral systems from First Past the Post (FPP) to MMP 
will alter the pattern of party representation in the House of Representatives and its select 
committees. New Zealand will move from a system characterised by stable single-party 
majority governments to a political arrangement in which it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible, for a single party to control the majority of seats in the House. Accordingly, the 
normal result of elections under MMP will be the formation of either single-party minority 
governments or majority coalition governments. This will inevitably cause some political 
power to slip from the Cabinet and governing party, where it resided under FPP, to be more 
diffused among the parties represented in the House. An altered power relationship in the 
House will necessarily alter the power relationships within select committees. Although 
MMP will result in major changes to the relationship between the Government and the 
House and in the power dynamics within the House of Representatives and committees it 
will not, of itself, change the fundamentals of the Westminster system by which the New 
Zealand Parliament operates. 
This paper deals only with the legislation scrutiny function of select committees. It does not 
explore in any depth their inquiry function, exept where this has some effect on committees' 
scrutiny of legislation. Nor does it discuss the jurisdiction of the Regulations Review Committee 
or the 'business' select commmittees. 
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Patterns of law-making 
New Zealand, before the introduction of MMP, could be regarded as possessing a system of 
law-making whereby the Government made laws but was obliged to submit its proposals to 
the Parliament for consideration. The Parliament's consideration-the most important part 
of which was conducted by select committees--did not normally result in any substantial 
alterations to the principles and policies of the Bill. This system also ensured that any 
legislation proposed by other parties in the House would only succeed if it won the support 
of the Government. 
With the introduction of MMP two main scenarios will emerge. When a government does 
not command a majority of the House, the power of the other parties in the House will 
increase. Power will become less concentrated in the governing party, and New Zealand 
will develop more of a parliamentary system. This has great implications for Parliament's 
select committees, as the House of Representatives will possess an increased ability to make 
changes to or even decline its approval for the Government's legislative proposals. 
Accordingly, the other parties in the House will become more politically effective in their 
dealings with the Government. 
Alternatively, where a coalition Government commands a majority in the House, less power 
will devolve to Parliament. Decisions on policy-whether in general or contained in 
particular Bills- will continue to be made by the Government coalition partners rather than 
the House itself. However, decisions made by the coalition require the agreement of two or 
more parties. These parties by definition will together hold a majority of seats in the House 
and represent a majority, or near a majority, of voters. Conclusions reached by the coalition 
partners will therefore be reached on a consensual or negotiated basis because of the need to 
gain agreement from two or more parties. They will also be stronger and more politically 
acceptable because they will have the support of a majority of the House and a majority of 
voters. 
Effectiveness of committees 
Under either scenario it is unlikely that the political effectiveness of committees will be 
enhanced. In other words, committees may not be able to have frequent and significant 
influence over matters of policy and be periodically able to deny the Government either the 
approval or the means to carry out a particular policy in legislation.2 Under MMP it is 
unlikely that select committees will acquire the increased independence of party required 
2 This definition of effectiveness comes from Michael Rush, "Parliamentary Committees and 
Parliamentary Government: the British and Canadian Experience" (1982) 20 Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 138, p 138. 
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for them to exercise an independent role in the policy process. Committees will not become 
in any major extent political entities in their own right. They will remain to a large degree 
subordinate to the dictates of party politics. Indeed, under MMP-an electoral system 
which gives political parties a formal place in the constitution for the first time-
committees may well become increasingly subject to party decisions. This does not mean 
that committees will not be able to exercise power independently of Government, rather, it 
suggests that they will not be able to exercise political power independently of party. 
It should be noted that the way in which the political effectiveness of committees is defined 
above is not the only way the political power of committees can be measured. The 
definition offered above emphasises the ability of committees to hold the Government to 
account by a forceful assertion of the power of committees to make substantial changes to 
Bills and to deliver stinging critiques of Government action or inaction. This power can be 
phrased at a much lower level. Bernard Crick, for example, would argue that the political 
effectiveness of committees should be limited to "influence, not direct power; advice, not 
command; criticism not obstruction; scrutiny not initiation; and publicity not secrecy".3 
In assessing the appropriate standard to apply, much depends on how one views, m 
normative terms, the relationship between the Parliament and the executive Government. If 
one starts with from the position that legislating is primarily a function of the Parliament, 
the changes made to Bills as a result of debate, or through the result of committee 
deliberations, will be regarded as relatively unimportant. They will be a manifestation of 
Parliament's ability to make the law as it chooses. On the other hand, if one believes that 
law-making is the Government's responsibility, then a different and more critical view of 
the changes made in the House will be taken.4 Changes made by the House or its 
committees, especially if they are not sanctioned by the Government and can be seen as 
critical of the Government's position, will be perceived as unnecessarily disturbing the 
relationship between the Government and the House. 
However, a restricted definition of parliamentary or committee influence upon the 
executive, such as that given by Crick, may not be appropriate given the change of political 
culture expected to occur because of the introduction of MMP. The expectation exists that 
4 
Bernard Crick, The Reform of Parliament, 2nd ed, London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1968, 
p 80. Also, "The only means of parliamentary control worth considering and worth the House 
spending any time on, are those which do not threaten the parliamentary defeat of a government, 
but which help to keep it responsive to the underlying currents and the more important drifts of 
public opinion" (ibid, p 79) and "Parliament should not and does not threaten the ability of the 
government to govern", Crick, "Whither parliamentary reform", in AH Hanson and Bernard 
Crick (eds), The Commons in Transition, London: Fontana/Collins, 1970. 
See JAG Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills, London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd, 1974, pp 195-6. 
4 Steven Condie 
MMP will transfer substantive political power to Parliament. This transfer should, 
according to advocates of MMP, lead to Parliament and its committees being able to 
exercise some substantive influence over Government policy as embodied in proposed 
legislation. Accordingly it is appropriate to assess select committees' likely political 
effectiveness under MMP in terms of their capability to effect substantive changes to the 
Bills which they examine and the potential of committees to deliver effective rebukes to the 
Government. 
The effectiveness of select committees can also be discussed in terms of their ability to act 
as a 'safety valve' for public opinion on a Bill, their ability to provide exhaustive technical 
scrutiny of the provisions of a Bill, and their ability to assist the House in dealing with a 
greater legislative workload than it would without them. These are very important roles of 
select committees but are not central to the ability of committees to act as an effective 
political check on Governments. 
Development of New Zealand's committee system 
Under FPP, the Government of the day effectively .::ontrolled Parliament. One means of 
improving Parliament's ability to hold the executive to account is through its committees, 
and New Zealand, since 1985, has possessed one of the most well-developed committee 
systems in the world. 5 Committees, provided they are sufficiently independent and possess 
wide enough powers, provide a powerful forum for small groups of MPs to engage in in-
depth scrutiny of Government legislative proposals and its policies, administration, and 
expenditure. They perform tasks that Parliament itself should perform but does not because 
work is too detailed, technical, and complicated for the entire House to perform. New 
Zealand's parliamentary committees possess extensive formal powers and are empowered 
to conduct extensive hearings on Bills and make major changes them based on the evidence 
that they hear. Further, committees can conduct inquires into all aspects of Government 
policy, administration, and finance. 
These powers allow select committees to effect some control over governments' exercise of 
power. However, although committees have extensive formal powers, they have seldom 
exercised them to their fullest extent. Select committees have in general lacked real political 
effectiveness. They have been unable to hold the Government to account both in terms of 
the scrutiny of Government policies as embodied in Government Bills and in terms of 
See, for example, Austin Mitchell, "The New Zealand Way of Committee Power" (1993) 46 
Parliamentary Affairs 91. 
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holding inquiries into Government activities. In other words there has been a gap between 
the formal powers of committees and their willingness or ability to exercise those powers. 
The main reason for this gap between theory, or expectation, and practice is the domination 
of party political interests over the views and beliefs of individual MPs. Currently, although 
MPs in select committees do behave in a less partisan manner than in the House, on issues 
of contentious policy their party affiliations will dominate any conclusions they may 
themselves reach. Under MMP this is unlikely to change. Party affiliations, if anything, will 
become stronger with the introduction of MMP, because of the constitutional status it gives 
to parties and the difficulties facing those who would wish to set as independent members 
of Parliament. These factors will be reinforced by the actions of the political parties as they 
attempt to make certain the continued loyalty of their MPs. The political imperative under 
MMP is to maximise party strength in the House by ensuring that the party remains 
cohesive. Party leaders must have assurance that their members will remain constant if the 
leaders are to negotiate effective political bargains with other parties. 
Further, while select committees provide an excellent 'safety valve' for public submissions, 
they do not necessarily provide a particularly useful forum for the political bargaining and 
negotiation that will be required to reach policy agreements under MMP. Under a majority 
coalition government it is likely that the necessary political compromises will be worked 
out before a Bill is introduced into the House. In that case it would be very difficult for a 
select committee with a majority consisting of members from the coalition parties to make 
substantial changes to the policy of the Bill. When a minority government is in power, 
select committees may still not be the most appropriate place for the formulation of the 
political compromises necessary to ensure that a Bill passes through the House. It is likely 
that compromises will be reached between the parties, independently of the select 
committee process, with the fruits of that agreement being implemented in the Committee 
of the Whole House. Even were a committee able to make extensive changes to the 
legislation put forward by a minority Government, there is no guarantee that the decisions 
reached by the committee would be acceptable to the majority of the House. 
SELECT COMMITTEES UNDER FPP 
Changes to Standing Orders in 1979 and 1985 
The current formal powers of select committees were introduced by changes to Standing 
Orders in 1979 and 1985. These major revisions of the rules applying to select committees 
evidence a willingness and desire to give them more power and responsibility. They now 
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see almost all legislation introduced into the House referred to a committee, and committees 
are able to initiate their own inquiries. The strength of this trend would suggest that there is 
no prospect of the formal powers and responsibilities of select committees decreasing as a 
consequence of the adoption of the MMP electoral system, and that there is some prospect 
for their formal powers to increase. However, as noted above, increased formal power does 
not automatically mean increased power in practice. While select committees have 
possessed very wide powers since 1985 they have not been used to their fullest extent and it 
appears that the political dynamics of MMP may work towards ensuring that the powers are 
never fully developed. 
The amendments to Standing Orders in 1979 gave a greater role to select committees than 
they had previously enjoyed. From that time almost all Government Bills and every private 
member's Bill was automatically referred to a committee.6 This dramatically increased 
committees' importance and workload, and culminated the expansion in the responsibilities 
of select committees in the scrutiny of legislation that had been under way since the mid-
1960s. Before that time only Bills affecting Crown land were subject to mandatory referral 
to a committee. Other Bills were referred, if at all, to ad hoe committees after their second 
reading.7 This, of course, meant that select committees could have no influence on the 
policy of legislation, and were confined to ensuring that the provisions of a particular Bill 
properly implemented the Bill's policy. Before 1979 between a fifth and a half of Bills were 
referred to a select committee.8 In the 1955 session, of the 119 public Bills introduced, only 
46 were referred to a committee, while in the 1978 session only 26 of the 71 Government 
Bills introduced were referred to a select committee.9 Some of these were referred after the 
second reading. 10 
The only exceptions to the current rule that all Bills are referred to a select committee after 
their introduction and first reading are Bills introduced under urgency (normally budget 
legislation), and Appropriation and Imprest Supply Bills. 11 The Standing Orders Committee 
in 1979 recommended that Bills "of a financial or budgetary nature", or money Bills, should 
not be referred to select committees. 12 However, the definition of money Bills has become 
6 
9 
10 
II 
12 
SO 217(1 ). See also Standing Orders Committee, Final Report for 1979, [1979] AJHR 114, pp 7-
8, the most relevant part of which is quoted by Walter Iles, "The New Zealand Experience of 
Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation", [1991] Statute LR 165, pp 165-7. 
Robert N Kelson, The Private Member of Parliament and the Formation of Public Policy: a New 
Zealand Case Study, Toronto, University of Western Ontario, 1964, p 85. 
Geoff Skene, New Zealand Parliamentary Committees: An Analysis, Wellington, Victoria 
University of Wellington Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, pp I 1-12. 
Kelson, above n 7, p 85; Iles, above n 6, p 165. 
Iles, above n 6, p 167. 
S0217(4). 
Standing Orders Committee, above n , pp 7-8 . 
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increasingly restricted, and now encompasses only Appropriation and Imprest Supply 
Bills. 13 The former is considered by select committees when they examine the estimates for 
Government departments even though the formal Bill is not, while the Imprest Supply Bills, 
of which there are an average of three a year, are passed in one day and so allow no time for 
committee consideration. 14 
This demonstrates an increasing tendency to that all Bills, with only very limited 
exceptions, are referred to select committees. This has had the effect that in 1987-89 the 
proportion of Bills referred to a committee was 83%. 15 In 1994 the Clerk of the House 
estimated that at least 90% of Government Bills, and 100% of all other Bills, are referred to 
select committees. 16 It also demonstrates a changing attitude of the House towards 
committees and the role they perform. It is now recognised that committees are able to 
scrutinise legislation which creates enormous political controversy. One reason is that the 
parties recognise that committees are clearly under the control of the governing party and 
will not make. recommendations which either surprise the Government or are politically 
unacceptable to it. 
The 1985 changes, implemented as part of the Labour Government's election manifesto, 17 
further increased the importance and powers of committees by providing them with an 
independent inquiry function. Such a move had been suggested to the Standing Orders 
Committee when it conducted its 1979 review, but rejected. 18 In its 1984 general election 
Open Government Policy, the Labour Party stated that it would reorganise the select 
committee system from "first principles". 19 After a report from the Standing Orders 
Committee,20 the House adopted new Standing Orders in 1985 substantially embodying the 
Labour Government's policy.21 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
SO 2 l 7(4)(a) and (b). 
David McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, 2nd ed, Wellington: GP Publications, 
1994, p 262. 
Skene, above n 8, pp 11-12. 
McGee, above n 14, p 262. 
Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming Our Political System, 
Dunedin, John Mcindoe, 1992, p 110. 
Standing Orders Committee, above n 6, pp 11-12. This was the ostensible reason. The real reason 
was more political and personal, the then Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, refused to allow the 
introduction of such committees to New Zealand. See Skene, above n 8, p 3. 
New Zealand Labour Party, "Open Government Policy 1984" in NZLP, 1984 Policy Document, 
Wellington, NZLP, 1984, paras 2 and 3, quoted in Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An 
interpretation of New Zealand's Constitution and Government, 2nd ed, Auckland, Oxford 
University Press, 1987, Appendix 1, p 218. 
Standing Orders Committee, First Report 1985, [1985] AJHR Il4A. The Committee was 
appointed on 17 August 1984 and part of its terms of reference was to "study the organisation 
and powers of select committees and recommend such changes as may be necessary or desireable 
to ensure for their effective operation, and in particular to provide for a more systematic scrutiny 
of Government activity." The new inquiry function for committees was based on reforms 
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The independent power of inquiry is expressed in Standing Orders as the power "[t]o 
examine the policy, administration, and expenditure of departments and associated non-
departmental government bodies related to [the subject area of the committee]".22 This 
power allows a select committee to investigate all Government bodies and all Government 
agencies within its subject area. However, should a committee wish to investigate 
something outside its subject area, it must ask the House for a specific power.23 Should two 
committees wish to investigate the same matter, the Speaker decides which committee can 
conduct the proposed inquiry.24 Before 1985, most committees possessed no independent 
power of inquiry and were limited in their inquiries to matters referred to them by the 
House.25 
Provisions are made in Standing Orders for the results of any committee report to be 
debated in the House for up to one hour. Further, the Government must, within 90 days, 
Table a response to the committee's reports. However, there is no provision in Standing 
Orders which allows that response to be discussed in the House. 26 
Currently, Standing Orders provide for 13 'subject' committees. These have terms of 
reference which, between the committees, cover the whole field of government activity.27 
Subject select committees have four separate parliamentary functions: (1) scrutiny of 
legislation; (2) conducting inquiries into government administration; (3) examination of 
estimates; and ( 4) consideration of petitions. In addition, Standing Orders provide for four 
further committees covering various matters, while the current Parliament also has three 
committees which will operate for the duration of the Parliament.28 Temporary committees 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
introduced to the House of Commons in 1979. The committee believed that its proposals would 
"greatly strengthen the accountability of Government to Parliament by the more systematic, 
comprehensive scrutiny of Government activity" (p 3 5). 
Some policies were not implemented becuase it was believed that they would have unduely 
slowed down Parliament. See Palmer, above n 17, p 110. This, perhaps, confirms the statement 
"Parliamentary procedure .. . is best not seen as a set of impartial rules designed to facilitate the 
transaction of public and private business, but as a political instrument largely desiged to help the 
governing party to govern." SA Walkland, The Legislative Process in Great Britain, London, 
Allen & Unwin, 1968, p 68, quoted in Gavin Drewry, "The Legislative Implementation of Law 
Reform Proposals" (1986-7) Statute LR I 6 I. See also David McGee, "The Influence of 
Parliamentary Procedure on the Form of Legislation in New Zealand" (1991) 12 Statute LR 135, 
p 135. 
so 345. 
See, for example, NZPD, vol 518, pp 4308-9 (1991), cited in McGee, above n 14, p 210. 
See, for example, [1991-3] AJHR Il8B, para 126(b), cited in McGee, above n 14, p 210. 
McGee, above n 14, p 210. 
See SO 374 to 377. 
so 345. 
McGee, above n 14, p 210. 
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have also been appointed from time to time, mainly to scrutinise specific highly technical , 
complex, or 'conscience' Bills. 29 
These changes were designed to increase parliamentary scrutiny and control of the 
executive, and were accompanied by changes to Standing Orders which required all 
proceedings of select committees during which evidence was heard to be open to the public 
and the media.30 They also signal a distinction between the work parliamentarians conduct 
in the House, and the work they conduct in committee. As Geoff Skene puts it, "If the 
House was preoccupied with the political struggle to win and maintain power, the 
committees should concern themselves with the less partisan mechanics of legislating."31 In 
other words, the changes signalled that MPs were required to act as parliamentarians while 
working on committees, and as party politicians when engaged in debates in the House.32 
Such a distinction had been recognised by the Standing Orders Committee in 1979.33 
However, it is an important indicator of the limits of select committee scrutiny of 
legislation. The committees have been recognised as being indispensable for the technical 
scrutiny of legislation and allowing public input into the legislative process. They are not 
regarded as places where overtly political battles should be fought. Indeed, committees have 
only been given extensive powers on the basis that they will be exercised according to the 
wishes of the governing party and that they will remain under the effective political control 
of the Government. MMP will not transform committees into arenas in which political 
negotiations are conducted and compromises reached . However, committees will remain a 
place for intensive technical scrutiny of legislation and the hearing of public submissions. 
Current provisions of Standing Orders 
Although all Bills stand referred to a select committee after they have been introduced and 
read a first time,34 the Minister in charge of a Bill must move a motion nominating a 
particular committee to consider the Bill.35 He or she may also include in the motion 
altered terms of reference for the committee, which may limit or extend the powers of the 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Ibid, pp 207-8 . 
SO 351. See Palmer, above n 19, pp 132-3 ; and above n 17, p 112. 
Skene, above n 8, p 6. 
Dr Martyn Findlay noted in 1978: "It pleases me greatly that in committee one can to a very 
considerable extent put aside party affiliation and all members can work cooperatively.", quoted 
in Palmer, above n 19, p 136. 
Standing Orders Committee, above n 6. 
S0217(1). 
S0217(2). 
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committee m relation to the Bill.36 Other members may object to the terms of a Bills 
referral, and the motion may be amended .37 
Standing Orders require committees to have five members, unless otherwise stated in the 
motion setting up the committee.38 Currently, committees have memberships ranging from 
five to 12 members.39 A motion appointing a select committee must state the names of the 
members of the committee.40 Standing Orders contain no directions relating to the 
appointment of members to committees, and it would be valid to appoint a select committee 
consisting completely of Government or Opposition members. However, party numbers on 
various committees tend to follow the recommendations the Standing Orders Committee 
made in 1972.41 Committee membership generally reflects the constitution of the House, 
and their exact membership is determined by inter-party consultation.42 By convention, 
Ministers are rarely members of select committees. This is designed to give committees 
more independence, as well as freeing ministers for other work.43 
Changes in the personnel of committees are an administrative matter. Standing Orders 
empower the Speaker to authorise members to make changes in membership. This is 
normally achieved by authorising the chief whips or party leaders to make changes in their 
party's committee members. This ensures that the party balance is not upset, while allowing 
for maximum flexibility in the allocation of members to particular committees.44 One use of 
the power to substitute members is where parties staff a committee with different members 
depending on the topic currently before the committee. For example the Health and Social 
Services Select Committee has a completely different membership when it considers health 
matters than when it considers social welfare matters. The parties use this power 
extensively to cope with a lack of available MPs to staff committees, leading to a a situation 
where membership substitution hinders the effective functioning of committees. These 
various technical rules relating to the operation of committees and their relationship with 
the House may become increasingly important with the introduction of MMP.45 
See McGee, above n 14, p 261 and examples there cited. 
Ibid, pp 261-2. 
so 342. 
McGee,aboven 14, p217. 
so 343 . 
Standing Orders Committee, Report/or 1972, [1972] AJHR 119, p 12. 
McGee, above n 14, p 218 . 
Iles, above n 6, p 173. 
McGee, above n 6, pp 218-9. 
These issues are discussed below. 
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Inquiry role 
Of the various functions perfonned by select committees, the scrutiny of legislation 
dominates their workload, and has hindered the development of their inquiry role.46 
Although, over the past few years, the inquiry work has begun to gain in importance,47 
select committees, on average, still spend two-thirds of their time considering legislation.48 
This is not a constant figure across all committees and some committees have a much 
greater legislative workload than others. For example the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Select Committee has very little legislation to consider and can therefore devote much of its 
time to conducting inquiries. At the other end of the spectrum, the Justice and Law Refonn 
Select Committee nonnally has a workload that concentrates overwhelmingly on the 
consideration of legislation . This makes it very difficult for that committee to mount 
effective inquiries, although it has recently completed one into the Race Relations 
Conciliator. 
Committees do not conduct as many inquiries as they should to ensure the accountability of 
Government. When they do conduct inquiries they are mainly directed at areas which the 
committee members believe will gain for them the most media coverage and the highest 
public profile. This is perfectly understandable and tends to come as a result of the 
subordination of the inquiry function of committees to their function of scrutinising 
legislation. Committee members have only limited time to spend on inquiries, and so wish 
to make the most political impact with this time, especially as much of the work they 
perfonn on legislation does not will them very much public recognition. This Jack of public 
recognition of members ' work on committees naturally makes service on them unattractive 
to may MPs. Many MPs find their other work, for example in meeting the needs of 
constituencies, much more personally and politically rewarding than they time they spend 
staffing committees.49 This, of course, may contribute to a Jack of effectiveness of 
committees. 
The dominance of the scrutiny function over the inquiry function also limits committees 
becoming truly effective in scrutinising the Government and Government policy as 
46 
47 
48 
49 
See Geoffrey Palmer, "The New Zealand Legislative Machine" (1987) 17 VUWLR 285, 
pp 137-8. 
David Caygill, "Functions and Powers of Parliamentary Committees: A New Zealand 
Perspective" in Mai Chen and Geoffrey Palmer (eds), Public Law in New Zealand, Auckland, 
Oxford University Press, 1993, p 669. 
Iles, above n 6, p 168. This figure is from 1990. The Clerk of the House of Representatives 
recently estimated that average over all committees, they were spending 60% of their time 
considering legislation, and 40% of their time on inquiries: Interview with David McGee, 
Wellington, 19 July 1995. Transcript of interview held by the author. 
Palmer, above n 17, p 113. 
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contained in legislation. The inquiry function is perhaps the best and easiest way for select 
committee members to become intimately acquainted with the operation of Government 
without becoming a cabinet minister. It is a way to gain in depth knowledge of policy and 
the Government process. Without this development of expertise, the overall functioning of 
select committees cannot develop to its full potential. This is true both in the inquiry mode 
and in the scrutiny of legislation mode. 
MMP will have a significant impact on the time committees spend on their respective 
functions. It may be that the volume of legislation passed under FPP will be unsustainable 
under MMP. In that case, the inquiry role performed by committees will almost certainly 
increase in importance. Whether committee's inquiries will become more of a political 
weapon under MMP than they have been under FPP appears to very much depend on the 
sorts of Government that MMP elections and inter-party negotiations produce. 
Committees may also conduct inquiries into the policy behind existing legislation and the 
administration of the legislation by the Government, and recommend appropriate changes to 
the legislation. Recently the Health and Social Services Select Committee conducted an 
inquiry into the provisions of s 11 Social Security Act 1964, and the Finance and 
Expenditure Select Committee conducted an inquiry into the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment.50 Both inquiries resulted in recommended amendments to existing 
Acts, some of which were implemented by the Government. However, committees 
conducting inquires have to be careful to ensure that their recommendations are seriously 
considered by the Government. They must management their inquiries to ensure that the 
results are politically acceptable to the Government and are workable and capable of 
implementation. If committees fail to do so, their recommendations will be ignored by the 
Government. The inquiry by the Health and Social Services committee is a good example of 
where a committee was listened to be the Government. However, in that case the committee 
was in fact conducting an inquiry the Minister had asked them to undertake and were 
undertaking the policy development work for a reform the Minister way already 
considering. 51 MMP may see committees conducting more of these inquiries of their own 
50 
51 
See the Social Services Committee, Inquiry into the Privileges Provisions of Section 1 J of the 
Social Security Act 1964, [1994] AJHR., I 12A, discussed in 17 TCL 48/4 (the committee's 
report) and 18 TCL 9/11 (the Government's response). See also the Supplementary Order Paper 
(No 85) which proposes to introduce those of the committee's recommendations with which the 
Government agrees into the Social Welfare Reform Bill currently before the House. Note, too, 
the Environment Amendment Bill 1995 (85-1) which implements the recommendations of the 
Finance and Expenditure Committee's report on its inquiry into the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for the Environment. 
Interview with David McGee, above n 48. 
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initiatives m order to provide a proper policy basis for the introduction of reforming 
legislation, which may also include private members' Bills. 
Under MMP committees may not need to be so concerned about the political acceptability 
of their recommendations as under FPP. This is especially true in the case of a minority 
Government. However, in order to ensure that its recommendations are seriously considered 
and implemented, committees will need to pay close attention to the politics of the topics 
they investigate. This is especially true if a committee wishes its recommendations to be 
implemented by Government. A committee may also wish to reach conclusions contrary to 
a Government's stated policy and then have one of its members introduce a private 
member's Bill to implement the recommendations.52 
Scrutiny of legislation 
Select committee scrutiny of Bills usually involves three distinct stages: (I) the hearing of 
submissions from the public and interest groups; (2) the consideration of the submissions, 
and departmental reports and recommendations on the submissions; and (3) deliberation on 
the Bill and proposed amendments clause by clause. On referral of a Bill to a select 
committee, the chairperson of the committee usually requests submissions from the public. 
This is normally done by newspaper advertisements, although committee chairpersons have 
sometimes issued invitations to particular persons or bodies requesting submissions.53 
Occasionally, when considering a particularly urgent matter, the chairperson will not call 
for submissions, but this is rare. 54 In the normal course of events three to five weeks is 
considered appropriate for Bills where no special factors apply. Special factors can include 
the urgency of the Bill, when it was introduced, its complexity, and the extent of public 
interest. 55 The chairperson and the clerk then organise a series of hearing for those who 
wish to supplement their written submissions with an oral presentation before the 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Select Committees in the United Kingdom have recognised for some time that they have a 
continuing responsibility for the recommendations they make. See the Fourth Report of the 
Home Affairs Committee, HC 744 of 1979-80, quoted in Ian Marsh, Policy Making in a Three 
Party System: Committees, Coalitions, and Parliament, London: Methuen, 1986, pp 92-3. 
Iles, above n 6, p 169. See for example [l 987-90] AJHR, 14c, p 5 (the Public Finance Bill 1989), 
quoted in McGee, above n 14, p 264. 
An example of submissions not being called for is the Taxation Reform Bill 1987: see [l 987-90] 
AJHR 14A, p 10, cited in McGee, p 264. Note also the Commissions of Inquiry Amendment Act 
1995 which was introduced and referred to the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee on 
20 July for consideration and report back by 25 July 1995. The Committee was empowered to 
receive briefings from departmental officials and hear submissions from invited groups. See 
NZPD, No 39, pp 8029-8038, 20 July 1995 (Introduction), and NZPD, No 49, pp 8083-8091 
25 July 1995 (Report stage). 
Iles, above n 6, p 169. 
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committee.56 Sometimes the urgency of the Bill or the sheer weight of submissions may 
force the committee to attempt to "group" submissions so that those with similar points to 
make present their views together, impose a time limit on oral submissions, or even refuse 
to hear some submissions.57 Generally, proceedings of committees at which evidence is 
heard are open to the public and the news media. 58 However, committees do have power to 
hear evidence in private,59 and also to declare that some of the evidence is secret evidence 
which cannot be divulged without an express order of the House even after the committee 
has made its report. 60 
Once the committee has heard all submissions on a Bill, it moves into the consideration 
stage. At this time the members weigh the submissions and consider departmental reports 
on submissions and any other departmental reports requested by the committee. The 
department will usually provide their comments on submissions and recommendations for 
amendments to the Bill based on submissions or further thinking by departmental officials. 
This report is very important as it often provides the foundation for the select committee's 
thinking and discussions on the Bill.61 It has been noted that this privileges departmental 
officials and it has been suggested that the consideration process should be more open to 
allow the officials' advice to be contested by the original submitters.62 There is some merit 
in this proposal as, especially with complicated legislation, there appears to be the danger of 
committee members being "captured" by departmental officials. Allowing the advice of 
officials to be further commented on by submitters would guard against this danger and 
would increase the openness of the policy process. 
Following the consideration stage the committee moves to deliberate on the Bill clause by 
clause. At this stage the committee discusses and decides on amendments proposed by the 
members at the consideration stage and further amendments proposed by members during 
the deliberations. 
56 
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Committees possess a discretion concerning whether or not they will call submissions. For 
example a convention appears to have developed that where a private member's bill deals with a 
topic on which Government legislation is shortly expected, the committee will delay calling for 
submissions on the private member's bill until the Government bill has been introduced and 
referred to the committee: see Reply by Chris Fletcher, Chairperson of the Planning and 
Development Select Committee, to Question from Judith Tizard, MP for Panmure (Question 
5186 of 1995), Replies Supplement, 28 August 1995 (No 95.19), p 54. 
See McGee, above n 14, p 264; and J F Burrows and PA Joseph, "Parliamentary Law Making" 
[ 1990) NZLJ 307. 
so 351(1). 
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so 367. 
Iles, above n 6, p 1 71. 
Jim Gordon, "The Taxation Law Reform Bill and the Select Committee Process", Accountants 
Journal, July 1991, 36, p 36. 
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During these three stages of legislative scrutiny, important political relationships are being 
exercised. Three sets of political relationships are of most importance. These are the 
relationships between the committee members and the party caucuses, between the 
committee members (especially the committee chairperson) and the Minister in charge of 
the Bill and cabinet, and between the various members and parties which make up the 
committee.63 
The relationship between the caucus and its members serving on a select committee is very 
important to the select committee examine legislation. The relationship differs between 
Government and Opposition parties. In each case several variables are important, the most 
important which include the political importance of a particular Bill being discussed, the 
attitude of the leadership and the party spokesperson or Minister to the Bill, and the 
pressure of other claims on the caucus' time. 
The Government caucus will, of course, always have advance warning of, and will have 
given its approval to, any Government Bill. The Opposition will generally, if caucus has 
advance knowledge that a Bill is to be introduced, decide upon a stance which the members 
as a whole will take towards the proposed legislation. Often, the Opposition caucus will 
have advance knowledge of the Government's legislative programme. The party spokes-
people and the whips devote part of their time to finding out such things. It is an accepted 
and important part of their respective jobs to closely monitor Government activity and to 
ask questions concerning the Government's legislative intentions. Any caucus discussion of 
a proposed Bill will concentrate on whether the Opposition will support or oppose its 
introduction. In this the caucus will be guided by its manifesto, the leadership and party 
spokes-people, and matters of basic political philosophy. This discussion normally ends in a 
vote which decides the caucus' basic position on the Bill. 
Once a Bill has been referred to a committee, much depends on its perceived political 
importance. Naturally, the more important it is the more often the party members on the 
committee will wish to report to the caucus. A very important matter will see the committee 
members, lead by the senior party member on the committee, reporting several times to 
their party. The members may report during the course of hearing public submissions on a 
Bill as issues begin to be identified from the submissions. These reports during the 
submissions stage of the select committee's consideration operate as briefings to members 
of the caucus. Their aim is to advance the caucus' collective understanding of the issues. On 
63 The follwing material on the political aspects of select committees' scrutiny of legislation is, 
unless otherwise stated, taken from interviews with the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, David 
Caygill, Wellington, l 9July 1995 (tape of interview held by author) and David McGee, the Clerk 
of the House of Representatives, above n 48 .. 
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less important legislation the committee members will not report back at all during 
submissions. 
Normally there 1s only one caucus discussion of a Bill. This occurs after the select 
committee has finished the consideration stage and before it embarks on the deliberation 
process . At this stage the caucus will decide upon a position for the members to take on the 
important clauses of the Bill and the issues it raises. Often the decisions will be reached by 
consensus, and there is seldom a formal vote on any particular matter. The caucus will not 
decide upon every single issue that will arise in the deliberations on the Bill. There would 
be insufficient time or interest for it to do so. 
This briefing process is, then, a very important part of a select committee' s scrutiny of 
legislation. It is also one which allows members a wide degree of latitude on the issues that 
they take back to caucus for a decision by that body. There are no firm rules on when 
committee members should report back: the appropriate level of caucus discussion varies 
with issues and with members. The deputy leader of the Opposition, David Caygill, phrases 
the discretion in this manner: "You ought to report on those things people would have 
expected you to have reported on".64 This directs attention to the likely interests of caucus 
members. If they are interested in particular matters then the caucus should hear about 
them. This may mean, on politically important Bills, several briefings and a final discussion 
on the stance the committee members should take during deliberations, including decisions 
on amendments that the members of the committee. There is typically a caucus resolution 
that the party' s members on a committee are authorised vote a particular way on a certain 
Bill. Often the discussions lead to a much less formal conclusion. Indeed, on a very minor 
technical Bill members may decide not report at all. This is a matter of political judgment, 
which MPs gain as they get more experienced, and sometimes less experienced MPs will 
take advice from the party leadership on whether to report back on a particular issue. 
The interaction with the caucus provides an important political check on the operation of 
select committees. Although the requirement to report back and seek caucus advise may be 
seen as limiting their effectiveness, it also ensures that the recommendations of the 
committee are acceptable to the wider group of MPs and do not come as a surprise to them. 
Committee members, especially those from the Government, must ensure that the 
conclusions they reach during the consideration stage will be acceptable to their caucus 
colleagues. This is especially true on contentious issues where there are likely to be strong 
opinions held by MPs. On less contentious issues, of course, decisions reached by the 
64 Ibid. 
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committee members are effectively final decisions subject to the formality of caucus 
approval. 
This process provides the MPs sitting on a committee with considerable discretion 
concerning the details of legislation. However, when considering the principles or important 
clauses of a Bill they are bound to accept the decision of caucus. Under FPP this has 
normally had the effect of providing the Government caucus with the final say over the 
principle of a Bill and the shape of the major clauses. In other words, the power to make 
political, as opposed to technical, decision lies with the Government caucus rather than with 
the members of the committee. This, however, should not be seen as caucus domination of 
committee members. The process by which decisions are made is normally consensual, and 
it is on only a very few occasions that there will be a serious disagreement between the 
caucus and cabinet and the members serving on a committee. 
If a committee were to act more independently, especially on politically important measure, 
it is likely that they would be less effective. Their recommendations would not have the 
support of the party caucus and, especially in the case of Government members, would not 
have the support of a majority of members of the House. If the recommendation of a 
committee regarding a Bill were politically unacceptable then they would not be accepted 
by the House. Rather, the Government would undoubtedly wish to make amendments to the 
Bill in the committee of the whole House, but without the benefit having heard submissions 
from the public and interest groups on the Bill. This would render committees completely 
ineffective from the perspectives of making a significant impact on the policy of a Bill, 
being a safety valve for the public, and easing the workload of the House. 
In practice the majority Governments generally produced by FPP allow committees to be 
politically effective but within strict limits. Committees are very effective at providing a 
safety valve for the public, and moderately effective in increasing the amount of work the 
House can get through and conducting technical scrutiny of Bills. They are less effective in 
truly scrutinising Government, whether by their consideration of legislation or their conduct 
of inquiries, because of the political relationship between the Government caucus and the 
majority of MPs on a committee. MMP will change the operation of committees by 
potentially making it easier for them to make substantial policy changes to politically 
important Bills. However, MMP may also make it less likely that a committee's changes 
will be accepted by the House, as was the norm under FPP. 
Government members of a committee also have contact with the Minister in charge of a 
particular Bill. It is quite unusual for the Opposition or non-Government members of a 
committee to have contact with the Minister. The Chairperson of the committee, if that 
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person is a Government member, normally fulfils the role of offering advice to the Minister 
concerning potential changes required to the Bill or issues which appear particularly 
problematic. Indeed, the relationship between the Chairperson and the Minister is probably 
the most important relationship in explaining the passage and shape of proposed legislation 
once it reaches the House. The Minister will possess a power to decide whether changes 
suggested by the Chairperson will go ahead, as all proposed changes must be examined and 
vetted by the Minister before they are referred to the Government caucus .65 
There is nothing wrong, in general , with the Minister taking a close interest m a select 
committee' s consideration of legislation. It is the Minister's Bill, in that the Minister is in 
charge of it while it is in the House. Further the passage of legislation is one of the most 
important functions of Government as it is the major way in which they carry out the 
promises on which they were elected. The Government has a deep interest in ensuring the 
legislation emerges from select committees is a shape that is politically acceptable to it. It 
would be naive to imagine otherwise. It is this interest, above all, that reduces committee's 
ability to act in a bipartisan way and which stifles their ability to act independently. This, of 
course, flows naturally from the nature of the Parliamentary system with its fused 
legislature and executive, and is one of the reasons why the United Kingdom Parliament has 
refused to send Bills to specialist select committees in order to hear public submissions on 
any more than an experimental basis.66 
Although, in general terms, ultimate power to accept amendments vests with the Minister, 
the process of reporting back can have the indirect effect of causing the Minister or reassess 
his or her position on the basis or public submissions and the thinking of the committee 
members.67 A good relationship will see the Chairperson given considerable independence 
by the Minister. This relationship will be built upon the confidence of the Minister in the 
ability of the chairperson. David Caygill cites the relationship which existed between 
former Minister of Finance Sir Roger Douglas, and the former chairperson of the Finance 
and Expenditure Select Committee, Trevor DeClene as a classic example of a chairman of a 
committee being given very great independence by a trusting Minister.68 Other Ministers of 
65 
66 
67 
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Edwin Micheal Bate, Health Legislation: The Health and Welfare Select Committee and the 
Social Services Select Committee, LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 
1990, p 4. 
"If Government legislation were regularly referred to specialised select committees, the party 
leadership would have a natural and proper interest in influencing the proceedings of those 
committees, and many of the characteristics which select committees now possess would be 
lost": First Report from the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1977-78, Report and 
Minutes of Proceedings, London: HMSO, 17 July 1978 (HC-588-1). See also Michael Jogerst, 
Reform in the House of Commons: The Select Committee System , Lexington, Kentucky: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1993; and Marsh, above n 52. 
See Griffith, above n 4, p 203 . 
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Finance have been very reluctant to see any changes made to their legislation. For example, 
the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee were unable to convince the Minister and 
the Government caucus to drop measures implementing an entertainment tax, even though 
the committee, after considering the submissions, firmly believed the tax should not be 
enacted.69 
Important discussions also occur within the committee between the Government and 
Opposition members of a committee. Many select committees dealing with less contentious 
Bills, or which are chaired by an MP willing to listen and adopt suggestions by Opposition 
members can see a large amount of constructive debate. MPs skilled in committee work 
from both sides can make quite significant progress to the detail of a Bill, and sometimes 
even to the fundamental principles of a Bill. 
Select committees, then, while given some latitude to change aspects of a Bill, are, under 
FPP, subordinate to the House, and in particular to the Government, which generally 
commands a majority in the House and a majority on committees. This would suggest that 
the introduction of extensive committee powers has not altered the central relationship 
between Parliament and the executive: the former is still effectively dominated by the latter. 
It this respect committees have not lived up to the all of the intentions of those that 
introduced the new system.70 
Select committees do make changes to Bills; most Bills examined will be amended in some 
way, and it is not uncommon for a Bill to be substantially re-written. 71 The trend, in recent 
years has been for committees to make more, and more substantial, changes to Bills, and it 
is clear that select committees "are making substantially more wholesale changes than in 
earlier years, while the number of minor amendments remains about the same. Committees 
are much more willing to change whole clauses in 1989 (307 on 20 Bills) than in 1977 (163 
on 36 Bills)."72 However, it is very difficult to provide any sort of way to measure the 
political importance of amendments made by committees. Qualitative distinctions run the 
risk of very rapidly being considered arbitrary. Also, apparently unimportant drafting 
amendments may become much more important because of court interpretations, 
unintended consequences, or unforseen circumstances. 73 Quantitative measurements, on the 
other hand, do not provide any analysis of whether a particular amendment is actually 
important. While select committees may make extensive changes to the text of the Bill, 
69 
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there is no way to tel I through quantitative analysis if those changes have altered the central 
principles of the Bill. 
It is an interesting question of the extent to which select committees can alter the policy of a 
Bill. Common sense suggests that those involved in the earliest stages of the policy process 
will have the most influence of the policy content of legislation. By the time a select 
committee comes to consider a Bill, the institutional weight of the Government is already 
aligned behind the Bill as it presently stands. The Minister in charge of the Bill will have 
come to a position on its contents, and this will have the support of the Cabinet and the 
Government caucus. There may also be significant support for the current form of the Bill 
from both the Government department in charge of the Bill, and any significant interest 
groups which may have been consulted in the policy formation process. It could be 
expected that a select committee might find it difficult to make extensive changes to a Bill. 
As Palmer notes: 
by the time the Bill is actually introduced into the House it has been the subject 
of considerable discussion, negotiation, and thought in private. Sometimes 
those negotiations will have included parties outside Government who may be 
vitally affected by it. The result of this elaborate procedure is to reduce the 
impact of submissions made to parliamentary select committees considering the 
legislation. Usually by the time the public has been able to consider the 
legislation the executive branch of Government has taken a stance upon it. 
Frequently the Minister in the course of this process will have become 
committed to important details. The Cabinet itself will have considered the 
legislation prior to its introduction, as will the Government Caucus.74 
This appears to be the opinion of a number of Ministers, who believe that committees can 
have little real input into the substantial policy of a particular Bill. Some members who 
have served on committees disagree and point to the occasions where committees have 
made substantial changes to Bills. It does seem that, in general, while committees may have 
difficulty in changing the substantial policy of legislation, they can change the 
implementation of particular policies, and ameliorate what they perceive to be the harsher 
aspects of the policies.75 
Two examples of Bills being completely re-written are the Children and Young Persons Bill 
(passed as the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act), and the Maori Fisheries 
Bill.76 In the case of the Children and Young Person's Bill, the changes made by the select 
committee in part reflected changes in attitudes within society as a whole; changes that the 
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Government caucus and the Minister in charge of the Bill were also receptive to. 77 In other 
words, as Iles puts it: "[C]hanges in policy may have resulted not from concern by members 
of the public but simply from a desire of the Government to change the policy embodied in 
the Bill or to implement a totally new policy."78 
Public submissions 
On major attribute of New Zealand's select committees is that they allow a wide degree of 
consultation with individuals and interest groups over the policy and implementation of 
legislation. The extent of public consultation undertaken is unusual in comparison with 
other Western democracies. New Zealand committees certainly involve the public in the 
process of legislating more that the parliaments of Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada, or the parliaments of Western Europe.79 Indeed, New Zealand has been regarded as 
something as a model for other democracies. Although the United Kingdom experiment 
with Special Standing Committees-which possesses powers similar to New Zealand's 
select committees- in the 1981-2 session, the experiment was quickly discontinued. 80 
However, groups and individuals in the UK have continued to advocate the introduction of 
comprehensive committee scrutiny of legislation, including the hearing of evidence from 
the public and interest groups. 81 
In constitutional and legitimacy terms, the hearing of evidence is undoubtedly the most 
important aspect of the scrutiny of Bills by committees.82 However, the political 
significance of public submissions is less certain. Although the right and willingness of the 
public to make submissions on Bills is now deeply entrenched, it is unclear how influential 
or effective those submissions are. It appears that submissions are most likely to be 
effective when they deal with the details of the legislation or are tightly focused .83 Even 
then, those making submissions cannot expect to see changes made to the principles of a 
Bill. Rather, the most that can be expected is the possible amelioration of aspects of 
particular policies. It seems that the political impact of public submissions will be little 
altered by the introduction of MMP. Although members of the public may believe that 
MMP will increase the impact of their submissions, this is unlikely to be the case. 
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Select committees are now seen as the only way in which the public can influence the 
legislative process. This perception has Jed to an increasing number of public submissions 
to committees.84 One piece of legislation, the Resource Management Bill, generated over 
I OOO submissions.85 It has also led to the expectation that members of the public will be 
allowed to comment on all legislation before committees, no matter how ineffectual that 
comment will be. The National Government was elected in 1990 with a manifesto promise 
of repealing the previous Labour Government's Employment Equity Act 1990. The 
necessary legislation was extremely simple and the drafting could not be improved, and 
there was no suggestion that the Government's policy would be changed on the basis of 
select committee submissions. Even so, committee hearings were held for 20 to 30 hours for 
members of the public to argue that the Employment Equity Act should not be repealed. 
There was an expectation that the public would be allowed to make submissions, no matter 
how ineffectual, on the Bill, and this expectation was met by the committee.
86 
The public participation in the legislative process provided by select committees increases 
the popular legitimacy of New Zealand's legislation. Even though the influence of public 
submissions on legislative policy may be more apparent that real, the belief that interest 
groups and individuals can alter to content of legislation in a tangible way can result in 
broad support for legislation. This is not necessarily because the legislation embodies the 
positions espoused by different individuals or groups, but because they have been allowed 
to express their opinions and arguments directly to parliamentarians and have those 
opinions noted and taken into account. 87 
There is no possibility that the number of public submissions to committees will decline 
under MMP. Indeed, apparent public perceptions relating to MMP suggest that there will be 
increased attempts to influence the legislative process through submissions. If this is so and 
no attempt is made to restrict the public's right to make submissions, it will slow further the 
select committee scrutiny of legislation. By implication this will also reduce the volume of 
legislation which the House can consider in any year. It should also be noted that public 
opinion would provide a significant hurdle in any attempt to alter the power of select 
committees as a consequence of the introduction of MMP. 
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Weaknesses in the current operation of select committees 
While New Zealand's select committees have, under FPP, proved to be quite useful tools, 
some elements of their operation have led to their functioning less efficiently than may have 
been expected. These concerns relate to staffing and the importance of select committee 
work among MPs. It has been suggested that the introduction of MMP will go much of the 
way to alleviating these problems, and this is quite correct in regard of most of them. 
However, it less clear that improving the efficient operating of committees will 
automatically lead to an increase in their political effectiveness. Indeed, there would seem 
to be only minor links between the ability of a committee to conduct its duties efficiently 
and is ability to be an effective part of the political process. The nature of the political 
process, it seems, will overwhelm any advantages efficiency would bring to committees as 
political entities. 
Perhaps the major weakness of the current select committee system is that, for most, if not 
all MPs, service on a select committee a low political priorities. Many believe that the time 
spent on committees would be better used on constituency work. MPs also find the work of 
scrutinising legislation too technical and demanding, and would rather be conducting 
inquiries into 'hot' political issues. 88 MMP could see this opinion change. Sixty or more 
MPs will have seats in Parliament as list MPs without direct responsibility to a particular 
constituency. Even though these MPs may also wish to take on some of the responsibilities 
of an electoral MP, it seems clear that they will possess more time to devote to committee 
work. Further, they will face less political pressure to work in a constituency as they do not 
have to make a constituency happy in order to continue their careers in Parliament. 
Another hindrance on the efficient day-to-day operations of committees is the continual 
substitution of members. This occurs where, for one reason or another, a party decides to 
change one or more of the members it has on a particular committee. Substitution works to 
allow MPs to attend to the other jobs they have to perform while ensuring there are always 
sufficient numbers on a particular committee to preserve party balance or to meet the 
quorum requirements. As Caygill notes, "Substitution obviously affects the continuity of 
committee business and is disturbing to the public and members alike."89 It is one of the 
major reasons, along with the pressure of work, for the slow development of the 
committees' investigatory role.90 Despite the reduction in the average size of committees 
brought about by the 1985 changes to Standing Orders, in the 1989 session, there was an 
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average substitution rate of J .2 per select committee meeting.91 The main reason for this is 
the small pool of members available to staff the committees and the increasing amount of 
business they have to get through. For example, once the members of the executive are 
taken from the Government caucus, there may be only 20 to 25 members left to staff all the 
Parliamentary committees 
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System recognised this deficiency in the operation 
of committees. It noted that strengthening the select committee system was "the best means, 
consistent with our constitutional tradition, of providing a parliamentary check on executive 
and administrative power."92 In its opinion, the best way to improve the function of 
committees and to allow them to reach their full potential was to increase the number of 
MPs available to serve on them. This was the most powerful argument for an increase in the 
size of the House.93 
SELECT COMMITTEES UNDER MMP 
MMP may lead to a more protracted and uncertain law-making process.94 This will occur 
because it is very unlikely that any one party will win a sufficient share of the party vote to 
gain a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. To form an effective Government, 
whether single-party minority or multi-party majority coalition, parties in Parliament must 
reach agreement. In other words, Governments in an MMP Parliament will govern or 
legislate only by agreement. This requirement of MMP-that Governments must make 
effective and durable political bargains to pass legislation-will be a major factor 
contributing to a probable increase in party cohesion and discipline. Far from turning the 
New Zealand Parliament into a Parliament of 120 individual MPs, MMP will see a 
strengthening of existing party discipline. However, political power spread will diffuse 
among more parties. That party discipline will remain at its current high levels or will 
possibly increase suggests that, under MMP, select committees will not be able to exercise 
an independent political voice. They will not be politically effective in their scrutiny of 
legislation, in that they will not be able to act independently of the parties to which 
members of the committee belong in order to have significant influence over the policy 
content of legislation or to prevent the passage of particular Bills. MMP will pass more 
power to parties other than a single governing party, but will not transfer power to the floor 
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of the House. If power is not transferred to the floor of the House then it is very unlikely 
that committees will be unable to operate as independent political entities. 
Types and formation of Government under MMP 
Throughout the international community single-party majority Governments are usually 
limited to FPP electoral systems such as Britain, Canada, India, and New Zealand.95 In 
Europe, none of the countries with a proportional representation voting system possessed a 
single-party majority Government. Under MMP, a party will need to win 46 to 47 percent 
of the vote in order to form a majority Government, as some parties will not gain 
representation in Parliament because of the 5 percent threshold.96 Previous election results 
show than no political party in New Zealand has won 50 percent or more of the vote since 
1951.97 The fact that MMP is a proportional system, where a vote for a minor party is less 
likely to be 'wasted' than under FPP, probably means that existing political parties will 
struggle under MMP to retain the share of the vote that they had under FPP. This indicates 
that MMP elections will not result in a single party winning a majority of the seats in the 
House. Accordingly, Governments will tend to form from a combination of the seat 
distribution decided by the election and the outcome of negotiations between parties 
represented in the House. 
The type of Government formed as a result of this process will be a major factor influencing 
the political effectiveness of select committees under MMP. There are four possible types 
of Government which may be formed; of these only two are likely to occur reasonably often 
or for a reasonable time. The various options are (1) a single-party majority Government; 
(2) a majority coalition Government; (3) a single-party minority Government; and (4) a 
minority coalition Government. It appears likely that only options (2) and (3) are likely to 
occur with any frequency. It is not part of this essay to speculate on which of the two likely 
options will predominate under MMP, but it is important to discuss how these types of 
Government will operate and how they are formed. 
If a coalition were to be formed, the most desirable coalition for the parties concerned and 
the most conducive for political survival will be a "minimum winning connected coalition". 
Such a coalition will possess a majority of seats in the House, and therefore be a winning 
coalition. It will also be as small as possible to the extent that this is consistent with it 
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holding a majority. That is, it will contain only the minimum number of parties necessary 
for it to obtain a working majority. Finally, the coalition will be as ideologically cohesive as 
possible.98 
The success of a particular Government, be it a single-party minority or a majority coalition 
can be measured in two ways: its viability and its durability. A viable Government is one 
which is able to enact a significant proportion-although not necessarily all--of its 
proposed legislation, and is also survive votes of confidence in the House. A Government's 
durability is measured by its ability to survive for the whole of a Parliamentary term.
99 
Obviously the two measurements are very closely linked. In particular a Government which 
lacks viability is unlikely to be particularly durable. Even if a Government has sufficient 
support in the House to survive a vote of no confidence, it may still be unable to enact 
particular pieces of legislation which it considers vital to its continued existence. In this 
case, although a Government may be reasonably viable, it is unlikely to be particularly 
durable. 
Any majority coalition must be formed on the basis of a degree of trust and agreement 
between the parties involved. Parties will need to work on building that trust by careful 
negotiation and consultation on legislative matters. Agreements, it appears, will normally be 
reached in private, but it is probable that normally they will not be kept secret and their 
contents will become public knowledge. 100 It appears likely that several agreements will be 
signed between parties in the Government. The foremost of these will be the overarching 
coalition agreement which will set forth the parameters of the Government. Subsidiary to 
this arrangement will be several agreements relating to the passage of particular pieces of 
legislation. These agreements will normally be in writing. 101 It is unclear how detailed either 
the coalition agreement or the agreements on individual Bills will be. It would seem 
reasonable that the coalition agreement will be reasonably detailed, while those relating to 
legislation may be more informal. It also appears likely that no single party in the coalition 
will introduce legislation without gaining the support of the other party or parties. Nothing 
seems more likely to upset an agreement between parties than for one party to introduce and 
promote legislation without the support of the other coalition parties. 
98 
99 
M Franklin and T Mackie, "Familiarity and Inertia in the Formation of Governing Coalitions in 
Parliamentary Democracies", British Journal of Political Science, 1983, Vo! 13, pp 275-298, 
cited in Boston, above n 95, p 2. 
Boston, above n 95, p 3. 
100 Note, however, that the recently dissolved coalition agreement between the Right of Centre Party 
and the Government was never made public. 
101 Speech by Don McKinnon, Deputy Prime Minister, Auckland, 21/7/95, reported in (1995) 
18 TCL 18/27. 
Impact of MMP on Select Committee Scrutiny of Legislation 27 
A minority Government, on the other hand, requires at least the tacit support of other parties 
to the extent that they will support the Governing party in a no confidence motion. It order 
to be a viable and durable Government, it will also wish to have some commitment from 
other parties to elements of its legislative programme. It is likely that a minority 
Government would prefer to have such agreements in writing clearly stating the 
circumstances in which support for legislation and matters of confidence will be 
forthcoming. A minority Government will also enter into agreements on an ad hoe basis 
regarding the passage of particular items of legislation. 102 Such agreements will be 
considered vital if a minority Government were to avoid embarrassing defeats in the House 
on matters it considers politically important. A failure to be able to negotiate such 
agreements will threaten the viability and therefore the durability of a particular 
Government. 
It appears, then, that agreements will be negotiated in the pre-legislative stage. In order to 
secure agreement it will be necessary for more than one party to be involved in the policy 
process. Further, the agreements will normally be made between the party leaders and 
spokes-people and the basis that the party they represent is cohesive enough to deliver the 
votes that the leadership promises. Such agreements will be formed completely 
independently of the select committee process. Indeed, such agreements must undermine 
the ability of select committees to be politically effective. First, the agreements will be 
entered into in the pre-legislative stage, which suggests that by the time a select committee 
comes to examine a bill, it will have quite a large degree of institutional and political inertia 
behind it. Second, for a committee to make a change to the bill will require the agreement of 
the caucuses of a sufficient number of parties to constitute a majority on the committee. 
This may be very difficult to achieve. Third, it must be remembered that the people who 
will broker the agreements regarding legislation will be the senior members of the party. 
These members are less likely to sit on committees, meaning that the people who make the 
agreements will not normally be those which sit through the committee scrutiny of the bill 
concerned. Fourth, even if a committee were able to effect changes to a bill, there is no 
guarantee, as exists under FPP, that the committee's amendments will be accepted by the 
House. This will occur because there is no reason for the composition of a particular 
committee to reflect the composition of the House. The pre-legislative agreement, which 
will be negotiated on a more open basis, will not normally be subject to this problem, as the 
legislation in question will not progress until a reasonably firm majority has subscribed to 
it. 
102 Ibid. 
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It must be remembered that the requirement to gain support from other parties is also a 
requirement for the operation of the FPP system. Even under FPP a Government can only 
govern effectively with the tacit agreement of the Opposition. If the Opposition were debate 
every point to closure at every possibility and ensure that all possible divisions were taken, 
legislating would be impossible. The Opposition's power of delay would ensure that the 
Government would not be able to pass very much legislation at all. Mostly, however, the 
relationship between the Government and the Opposition operates on a fairly harmonious 
level. As Griffith puts it: "The Opposition normally acquiesces to its minority role; it 
accepts the conventions that bind it in defeat." 103 It is only where the Opposition 
vehemently opposes to a particular Government act that it will use its weapons of delay, and 
it is very seldom indeed that an Opposition will use all of its possible weapons. 104 To do so 
would irrevocably damage the working relationship between the parties, and its actions 
would be remembered the next time the then Opposition sat on the Government benches. 
Even so, this relationship can be easily soured and may be more difficult to forge in the first 
place under MMP where there are more parties involved. This will be especially true if 
protest or non-system parties manage to overcome the 5 per cent threshold and gain 
representation in the House. 
It appears likely that pressures within the political system will push political parties towards 
the formation of a majority coalition Government. Not the least of these is the force of 
public, market, and interest group opinion. Parliament is under continual supervision by the 
whole of society, and if a minority Government becomes ineffective because of obstruction 
from other parties, then public opinion will begin to stir. Politicians will be placed under 
enormous pressure to make the system work, and parties will, it appears, need to be seen to 
be constructive in order to retain support. In other words, all parties will need to work 
towards fostering stability, and a party that appears to the public to be encouraging 
instability will almost certainly loose support at the next election. 105 
If the parties in Parliament cannot negotiate a coalition agreement then a single party, 
probably but not necessarily the largest, will attempt to form a minority Government. Such 
a Government may need to avoid introducing controversial legislation into the House in 
order to avoid potentially embarrassing defeats. Certainly, the legislative programme of the 
present minority National Government has been relatively unadventurous. It has decided 
against introducing legislation to implement policies which it had earlier proposed, for 
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example postal deregulation, and has declined to introduce legislation on a range of matters 
which it otherwise would have wished to address. However, this need not always be the 
case. Even a minority Government will be in some sort of arrangement with other parties, if 
only in able to survive a vote of confidence in the House. So long as that minority 
Government retains the tacit support of other parties, it should be able to introduce 
politically controversial legislation. What will be required is more consultation within the 
parties that make up the Government block. 106 Supporting this is the fact the New Zealand 
electorate appears to prefer strong Governments. If MMP means that minority Governments 
act in a timid manner, then there will be severe pressure for some sort of majority coalition 
to form. 107 Also in the favour of minority Governments is the ease with which they may be 
able to secure a dissolution of Parliament: 
Broadly, the easier it is for the Prime Minister of a minority government to 
secure a dissolution, the easier it will be for his government to survive. For the 
Prime Minister will be able to threaten his opponents with dissolution if he is 
defeated in the legislature. He will be under no pressure to negotiate with other 
parties to secure a coalition agreement if he believes he has a dissolution 'in his 
pocket'. 108 
This would be a case of the Government 'forcing the hand' of the parties which provide it 
with basic support in Parliament. They would have to choose between supporting the 
Government on matters they were not entirely in agreement with, or facing the prospect of 
either an early election or a new Government inimical to their beliefs. 109 In a recent, non-
legislative example, the National Government decided to make all items in the budgetary 
estimates matters of confidence, thereby forcing the United New Zealand Party to support 
the Government rather than risk facing an early election. 110 
Even so, a minority Government must be wary of not pushing its tacit supporters too far. It 
must always be remembered that a minority Government, by definition, does not have the 
support of the majority of the community. For this reason alone it, therefore, ought to be 
cautious in the programme it wishes to implement. It cannot, by reason of the fact that it is a 
minority in the House, promote contentious issues. Contentious matters must either be 
dropped from the legislative programme or pursued in a non-legislative way. This does not 
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mean that a minority Government will not have legislation to introduce. There are many 
ideas waiting to be introduced to the House and the number of possible areas for reform will 
not decrease. 111 Indeed, it has been suggested that the main impediment on a Government 
seeking to introduce legislation is not the House, but the resources of the Parliamentary 
Counsel Office. 112 
As under FPP, a majority Government under MMP will have no need to avoid introducing 
politically controversial legislation. However, in order to do so a coalition Government 
would require the agreement from the caucuses of all coalition partners. Once this is 
achieved, there is little or no need for further consultation or negotiation with the other 
parties represented in the House. Indeed, as under FPP, there would be significant 
disadvantages concerning delay in the legislative process and in giving opponents political 
ammunition were a Government to provide too much advance warning of its proposals. 
Party cohesion 
The evidence from other Parliaments elected by proportional representation suggests that 
party cohesion and discipline under MMP will be as strong as it was under FPP, if not 
stronger. The MMP electoral system will see at least 50 percent of MPs selected from party 
lists. This effectively includes political parties in the constitution. It also suggests that list 
MPs will find it very difficult to disobey the dictates of party leaders because they may find 
themselves removed from the list at the next election because of their perceived 
disloyalty.113 It is vitally important that parties retain strong degrees of cohesion under 
MMP, and it is inevitable that any outward shows of disunity will be treated very seriously 
by the party leadership. In order to strengthen party cohesion, it is also a possibility that 
New Zealand may implement so-called "anti-hopping" legislation. Such laws state that if a 
sitting MP resigns from a party, he or she is deemed to have resigned from Parliament and 
immediately looses their seat. 114 
It also appears that the thinking among politicians has also changed regarding the impact of 
MMP on party cohesion. Following the recent study trip of the members of the Standing 
Orders Committee to several European Parliaments, all of which were elected by some form 
of proportional representation, the current thinking, at least among members of that 
committee, is that MMP will not result in a Parliament of 120 individual MPs. Rather, there 
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will be 4 or 5 parties in Parliament. 115 Minister of Revenue, Wyatt Creech said in a recent 
speech: "Contrary to the expectations of some MMP advocates, 116 party discipline of 
members by their parties in the European PR jurisdictions is far tighter than in New 
Zealand". 117 
Changes to the strength of party cohesion will also affect the career structure of MPs. The 
current career structure for MPs is very simple. An MP is elected, serves an apprenticeship 
in the backbenches, and eventually, all things going well, is promoted to a frontbench 
position, and the party is successful, a cabinet post. There is no alternative for the gifted and 
ambitious MP. One of the key attributes that will see an MP promoted to the frontbench is 
loyalty to the party and the party leadership. Those inclined to show independence will not 
advance their careers, and may even be removed from the party entirely. Indeed, given that 
party loyalty may will increase under MMP, the position of so-called 'maverick' MPs in 
parties may become even more tenuous. This conclusion contradicts the expectations of 
some MMP advocates who believed that increasing the number of MPs in the House would 
strengthen committees and offer an alternative career ladder of MPs. If the job of committee 
chairperson was rewarding enough, it was argued, MPs would be drawn to that position as 
the possible culmination of their parliamentary career rather than as a position which 
assisted in their quest for a frontbench position. This would lead to a virtuous circle in 
which, as committees became more powerful, MPs would become more likely to wish to be 
members of them and, because they have an alternative to sitting on the frontbench, no 
longer need to show unthinking loyalty to the party and its leadership. 118 However, this is 
unlikely to happen under MMP as the number of new MPs introduced by the change of 
voting system will be insufficient to allow the position of committee chairperson to develop 
as a viable career option. It seems likely that party caucuses will be of the same size, if not 
smaller, than those which usually occur in the major parties under FPP. A position on the 
frontbench will still be the preferred position for any MP because it will still be attainable. 
The position of committee Chairperson only becomes attractive when a frontbench place 
becomes an impossibility or highly improbable. Further, as the size of party caucuses will 
not rise significantly, if at all, under MMP, all MPs of the same party will still be able to 
meet in the same room. This face-to-face meeting is a power tool for the socialisation of 
MPs and orientating them to seeing the pinnacle of their political careers as achieving a 
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frontbench spot. 119 Indeed, even in the United Kingdom Parliament, which has much larger 
parties and presumably has MPs who would be more willing to see committee work as a 
viable career structure, most MPs see a committee position as a stepping-stone to a 
frontbench position and most MPs serving on committees would, if offered the chance of 
joining the front bench, would take the opportunity. 120 
Select Committees' consideration of Bills 
The process of a committee's deliberation on a Bill will become more complex under 
MMP. Consider the case of a majority coalition Government. The Government members of 
the committee will need to win the support of two caucuses rather than one for the changes 
they wish to make to a Bill, as it appears unlikely that coalition partners will wish to have a 
joint caucus. 121 There appears to be no reason for the advent of MMP to change the 
convention that members of select committee will report back to their respective caucuses 
between the consideration and deliberation stages of the committee scrutiny of a particular 
Bill. Indeed, it is quite probable that the strength of this convention will increase as under 
MMP parties are recognised in the constitution for the first time. 122 There is also the real 
prospect that less discretion will be delegated to members of committees, especially 
Government members-whether they are part of a minority or a coalition Government--or 
members of parties which give tacit support to the Government. If the passing of a certain 
Bill is governed by a written agreement between parties, it is quite likely that a Government 
and its supporters will be Jess likely to accept amendments to the Bill because they may feel 
that the agreement will be undermined. The relatively free way in which committees 
currently alter the text of Bills may be altered by strong inter-party agreements formed 
before a Bill is introduced. The parties may consider it too difficult to renegotiate the 
original agreement or to win support from all of the relevant caucuses and therefore refuse 
to allow significant amendment to the text of the Bill as introduced. 123 
Where a minority Government holds power select committees may be able to insist on more 
widespread policy changes to Bills. In doing so, however, they must weigh the political 
consequences of their actions. To the extent committees make large changes to Government 
legislation they jeopardise the Government's effectiveness. This could have long-term 
effects such as the forcing of an early election or a change in Government. 124 The mere fact 
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that a committee has produced recommendations contrary to the Government's stated policy 
places immediate pressure on the Government. It must decide its attitude to the proposed 
changes. Probably its first question will be whether it will wish to seek to reverse the 
recommendations in the Committee of the Whole House. If the Government chooses that 
option it must also assess the support it has in the House over this matter and, if it is unsure 
of its support, determine whether it will make its proposed amendments a matter of 
confidence. It is to be expected that a minority Government will be reasonably sure of 
support for legislation it regards as politically important. To ensure it avoids an 
embarrassing defeat a Government will normally enter into agreements with other parties 
for the passage of particular Bills. This will normally avoid the need for a Government to be 
concerned about the effect of adverse recommendations from select committees 
Under MMP the House may need to more clearly delineate the time at which a committee's 
recommendations are adopted. Standing Orders currently state that committee 
recommendations on a Bill are deemed to have been adopted by the House when the Bill is 
read a second time. 125 The Clerk of the House, David McGee, suggests that there should be 
a definite stage in the passage of legislation where the House explicitly accepts or rejects a 
committee's suggested amendments. 126 This further requirement could assist where a 
particular committee has a majority of members opposed to the position of a minority 
Government on a particular Bill. Those members could well introduce amendments to alter 
the Bill's central purpose. If the Government possesses a majority able to support its own 
position, it should be able to insist on a stage in the House's consideration of the Bill where 
the committee's recommendations are approved or rejected by the House. 
Committees could improve also their ability to effectively scrutinise legislation through 
greater scrutiny of draft Bills. However, Governments have referred draft Bills to 
committees on only a very few occasions, and it appears that these experiments are unlikely 
to be tried again. Governments, when draft legislation, prefer to complete the work and 
introduce a Bill into Parliament rather than engage in a further scrutiny by a comm ittee. 127 
Indeed, given that the need arising from for inter-party negotiations on legislation will mean 
more discussion, albeit between parties rather than among committee members, before Bills 
are introduced, there appears to be no obvious reason why Governments under MMP would 
wish to subject their Bills to pre-legislative scrutiny. 128 In this context, issues also arise 
concerning the relationship of the House with the Government. It is the House's role to 
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critically examine Government initiatives. This process would become much more difficult 
if the House, by virtue of its select committees, has been involved in the basic policy 
formulation stage. 129 
One important change to come from MMP in the day-to-day operation of the committees is 
that the relationship between the Minister and the Chairperson of the select committee will 
change. A minority Government will be unable to insist that it holds the chairs of all 
committees. It would probably only be able to insist that it had a number of chairperson 
positions which approximated its representation in the House. 130 A majority coalition 
Government would almost certainly wish to share the committee chairs between the parties 
in proportion to the number of members each party brings to the coalition. However, there 
are exceptions to this proportionality rule. A small party which is crucial to the formation of 
an effective coalition may be 'overpaid' in terms of committee chairperson positions. Also, 
it two large parties form a coalition, they may share the chairperson positions evenly, even 
though one party may have more seats. 131 It is also likely that coalition partners will wish to 
prevent the other parties concentrating their power in particular portfolio areas. In that 
event, it is unlikely that one party would be allowed by its coalition partners to control the 
ministerial portfolio and have the select committee chairpersonship in the same policy area. 
This, again, is another way in which committees will be controlled by parties. The 
respective party strengths on committees will be decided by inter-party negotiations for 
ratification by the House. 
That, under MMP, committee chairs and Ministers will often come from different parties 
will redefine the relationship that has previously existed. No longer will there exist a senior-
junior relationship with the chair being taken into the Minister's confidence or vice versa. 132 
This will lead to a distancing of the relationship, especially if the Minister and the 
chairperson come from politically antagonistic parties. It would be foolish to say that under 
the FPP system was it previously existed that there were not cases where the relationship 
was strained. This occurred because the National and Labour political parties attempted to 
appeal to the greatest possible number of voters in order to maximise their percentage of the 
vote. This at times led to a situation where a Minister and a committee Chairperson could 
come from the same party but possess widely differing political views. 133 Even so, the MPs 
were still bound by their party ties. This will not be the case under MMP; and will 
necessarily lead to a greater distance between the Minister and the committee chairperson if 
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they come from different parties. This greater distance may leave greater opportunities for 
the chairperson to take greater political initiatives than are possible a·t the moment. 134 
However, it must be remembered that it is in the interests of both that they develop a sound 
working relationship, and that the development of this political relationship is also a matter 
of personality as well as ideology. 135 The Minister must have confidence in the chairperson 
for it to test the Government's legislation against public opinion and for the committee to be 
able to make recommendations which the Government will seriously consider and 
potentially agree with. In other words, the system of select committee of scrutiny of 
legislation cannot and will not work unless a working relationship exists between the 
chairperson and the Minister. 
That a committee chairperson and the Minister in charge of a Bill may come from different 
parties adds strength to the argument that Ministers ought to sit on committees when they 
consider legislation. The traditional role of the chairperson as the Minister's representative 
will undoubtedly change under MMP. However, there will still need to be a committee 
member of sufficient authority advocating and defending the Government's position. 
Undoubtedly, that function will fall to be discharged by the senior Government member on 
the committee as Ministers are very unlikely to want to devote their time to committee 
service. However, despite the obvious demands on Ministers' time, there still remains an 
argument that the Minister ought to be the main advocate for legislation he or she has 
proposed at all stages of the legislative process. At the very least, as occurs in the United 
Kingdom Parliament, junior members of the executive should sit on committees during their 
scrutiny of Bills. One situation which may see Ministers sitting on committees is where 
negotiations between parties produce a minority Government that lacks sufficient members 
outside of cabinet to fully staff the committees. It is quite possible that, under MMP, a party 
with less than 40 seats in the House could form a minority Government. Aside from 
increasing the power of the Cabinet over caucus, 136 in that case some Ministers may be 
forced to sit on committees, if only to keep up the party's presence on them. Another 
possible solution to this problem would be to allow the Prime Minister to appoint some 
cabinet Ministers from outside the legislature. 137 This would require an amendment to the 
Constitution Act 1986, 138 and would significantly change New Zealand's constitution in a 
manner legally and politically more significant than New Zealand's adoption of the MMP 
electoral system. 
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The relationship between select committees and the department officials that advise them 
will also change under MMP. This will occur most clearly where a Minister and a 
committee chairperson are from antagonistic parties. The officials' first duty is to the 
Minister, but they must also attend committee meetings and can be drawn into serving the 
Chairperson as well. If there is more distance between the Chairperson and the Minister, 
officials may need to tread more delicately. Committees may also become increasingly 
wary of advice offered by departmental officials and may demand increased funding to 
acquire independent advice from other sources. They may also adopt a practice of releasing 
for public or interest-group comment advice that officials have tendered during the 
consideration stage of a Bill in an effort to increase the contestability of that advice. 
If, under MMP, Governments become Jess durable departmental officials could gain more 
sway over committee scrutiny of legislation. At the moment, officials have considerable 
input into drafting a committee's amendments to a Bill. 139 If Governments were to change 
with greater regularity, it is likely that, because of the rearrangement of power between 
parties, the membership of individual committees would also change to reflect the new 
balance of power. For example if a majority coalition were able to form where previously 
there had been a single-party minority Government, the membership of committees will 
need to change to ensure that the new Government was in the majority in every committee 
and also possessed the chairperson's position. This would result in officials giving more 
briefings to incoming committee members who may also have less experience in their 
positions and in the subject area of the committee. This will have implications for the role 
of officials and their influence over the way in which committees examine legislation. 140 
Private Members' Bills 
Although individual MPs and minority parties may believe that there will be more prospect 
for success for private members ' Bills under MMP, much depends on the time allocated to 
them for parliamentary debate. Currently only one day per fortnight is available for debate 
on private members' matters. This is a reduction from the one day per week that existed 
immediately after the reform of standing orders in 1985. While that system was in operation 
the one day per week open for private members' Bills was quickly dispensed with by the 
Government as it sought more time in the Parliamentary schedule for its own legislation. 141 
It is possible that under MMP, where Parliament is no longer dominated by a single party, it 
may be feasible to move back to the House devoting one day every week to private 
139 Bate, above n 65, p 7. 
140 See Boston, above n 95, p 13. 
141 Interview with David Caygill, above n 63 . 
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members' Bills. This suggestion is one which has the support of the Clerk of the House. 142 
More likely is that the entire system of time allocation in the House will change. One way 
to achieve this would be through the introduction of a Business Committee to allocate time 
for business in the House a week in advance. This would provide certainty for both 
individual MPs and their parties. Such a device would also remove from the Opposition 
much of the current power it has to frustrate the Government's business. 143 This would need 
to be compensated by giving the Opposition parties a reasonable say in the formulation of 
the parliamentary timetable, including allocating a a reasonable time for private members' 
Bills.144 
If a Private Member's Bill is able to make it on to the Order Paper its chances of success 
increase dramatically in the case of a minority Government. A majority Government, if it 
does not agree with the principle of the Bill will be able to refuse its introduction, or, at the 
very least, make certain that it is 'buried' in a select committee. It is to be remembered that 
a majority Government will almost certain possess a majority on all committees, and 
therefore will be able to direct that the committee delays indefinitely its consideration of a 
particular bill. 
On the other hand a minority Government will not have this luxury. Rather, power in this 
instance passes to the other parties in Parliament, provided they are able to form a majority 
in support of a particular private member's measure. A minority Government must expect, 
it appears, to be defeated reasonably regularly on votes relating to the introduction of 
private members' Bills. Of course, a Government may see a particular private member's 
Bill as inimical to important parts of its political philosophy, and is entitled in that case to 
make the Bill a matter of confidence. 
A minority Government may also be unable to 'bury' a private member's bill in a select 
committee. Quote clearly, it will not have a majority on all committees. If the Bill is 
referred to a committee on which the Government does not possess a majority, it will be 
unable to control the select committee's consideration of it. Even if a minority Government 
does control to particular committee to which a Bill is referred, it may by prevented from 
burying the Bill by directions from the House. The other parties, when agreeing to the 
introduction of the Bill, may include some requirements in the motion referring the bill to a 
committees. Such requirements may include a stipulation that the committee report back by 
142 Interview with David McGee, above n 48 
143 See, for example, the debate on the Maritime Transport Bill, Hansard (1994), vol 540, pp 1610-
1624; vol 541, pp 2090-2136, 2217-2136, 2599-2754, and 2773-2787; vol 542, pp 3618-3624, 
3660-3662, and 3677-3680. 
144 Interview with David Caygill, above n 63. 
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a certain date. This is an important mechanism by which parties in the House can control 
the operation of select committees, and is likely to become more widely used in the future, 
especially when committees consider private members' Bills. 
Arrangement of committees 
The introduction of MMP will provide more MPs to staff committees. It may also see 
rearrangement of the current subject areas covered by each committee in order to even the 
workload among the committees. There could also be further changes to the size of 
committees consequent upon the greater number of parties which will probably be 
represented in an MMP Parliament. The current workload of legislation and inquiries is 
currently spread very unevenly about the select committees. The Justice and Law Reform 
Committee spends up to 95% of its time considering many technical pieces of legislation. 
Other committees, especially the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, spend most of 
their time conducting inquiries as there is very little legislation enacted in their subject area. 
The Health and Social Services Committee is currently very over-worked with both 
legislation and inquiries. There is also a natural separation in the subject matters considered 
by the committee, so much so that its membership changes depending on whether it is 
discussing a health or a social welfare matter. This suggests that there should be two 
committees in this case instead of one. 145 
A trend may also develop which attempts to have committees representing as far as possible 
the composition of the House. The convention by which the Government has one more 
member that the Opposition party on each committee is inappropriate for an MMP 
Parliament. 146 Accordingly, it is suggested that the House may move to a system where 
party representation on a committee is approximately proportionate to that party's 
representation in the House. This would require an increase in the average size of 
committees . Of course, this will not be possible on every committee, and there will be some 
political bargains struck regarding the representation of small parties on individual 
committees. A small party will not have the members to sustain representation on every 
committee and may wish to enter into some arrangement to have a representative on those 
committees which it considers most important. 
Another way in which the membership of committees 1s likely to change is in the 
background of the MPs staffing them. It is likely that, although MMP will see more women 
and Maori MPs elected due to parties placing such candidates in good positions on the party 
145 Interview with David McGee, above n 48 
146 See above. The current membership of select committees suggests that this convention has 
already been abandoned. 
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list, Parliament will become more representative of the professional middle classes. Such a 
change in membership could increase the overall ability of select committees by including 
more MPs who are what may be called professional politicians and who are committed to 
the select committee process. Further, list MPs may be able to devote more of their time to 
committee work as they may not need to do much electorate work. 147 Such MPs are likely to 
want to have an active role in formulating policy may wish to specialise in particular policy 
areas. They are also likely to look at work in particular committees as increasing the 
personal value of the work they do as MPs and providing them with substantial input into 
policy. 148 However, these MPs are still likely to which to advance their careers into 
Ministerial or frontbench positions in order to increase their individual input into policy 
decisions. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the essential career structure of the House will 
change as a result of the introduction of MMP. MPs will still generally see the culmination 
of their careers in rising to the front bench, and select committee service will be seen as one 
element to help further an MP's career. 
Inquiry role of committees 
If MMP proves to be an impediment to Governments enacting legislation then it appears 
clear that committees will devote more of their time to conducting inquiries. They may 
begin to become more policy devisors rather than the recipients of policy decisions that they 
are at the moment. 149 This cannot occur until the legislative workload is reduced and spread 
more evenly among committees, and until that occurs most committees will remain 
absorbed in scrutinising legislation. The increase in the number of MPs available to staff 
committees may also allow committees to conduct more inquiries. It is unlikely that 
inquires will be any more critical of the Government and its policies than they are at the 
moment. The central matter which will determine the attitude of committees to the 
Government is the number of Government members on each committees. If the 
Government is a minority, there will be more opportunity for committees to conduct 
inquiries which reach conclusions critical of the Government. In the case of a majority 
Government, this is unlikely to occur as the current political arrangements which restrict the 
political independence of committees in relation to legislation also exist when committees 
conduct inquiries. 150 
147 Compare Chen, above n 94, pp 26-7 with the comments of the Opposition Chief Whip, Jonathon 
Hunt reported in "Under MMP the lobbyist will be king", The Independent, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 9 June 1995, p 13. 
148 See Jogerst, above n 66, pp 12-13. 
149 Interview with David McGee, above n 48 
150 Interview with David Caygill, above n 63. 
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MMP, if it results in increased time for committees to conduct inquiries, will inevitably see 
committees investigating the policy behind existing legislative provisions and acting more 
generally in a law reform role. Committees, however, must, to ensure their political 
effectiveness, make certain that the Government heeds their recommendations. This 
requires committees to ensuring that the recommendations they formulate are politically 
acceptable to the Government. Indeed, committee members may need to enter into 
negotiations with the appropriate Minister and department. Although committees should be 
prepared to make unpalatable recommendations if they truly believe in them, they cannot 
afford to continually antagonise the Government if they wish their recommendations to 
receive more than merely bland replies without further action being taken. 151 Committees 
will need to work hard in order to make certain that they build respect within Parliament, 
and develop an expectation that their recommendations will be seriously considered and 
more often than not implemented by the Government. 152 The introduction of MMP will 
assist this process by allowing committees to have a more permanent membership and 
providing them with more time with which to conduct inquiries. These two factors will 
allow committees to acquire more expertise, both in their subject areas and in the conduct of 
inquiries, which in turn will lead to committees earning more respect from the Government 
and the departments. 
CONCLUSION 
The introduction of MMP will cause major changes to the New Zealand political landscape. 
However, it will not alter the fundamentals of the constitution or the fundamental 
relationship between select committees and the House of Representatives. In particular it 
will not see greater power to act independently devolve to committees. While MMP may 
provide some opportunities for committees to act more independently-and this will 
especially be the case under a minority Government-that independence will be more the 
independence from the control of a majority Government rather than independence from 
party control. Select committees will not be able exercise independent political control 
because they will not, under MMP, be able to operate independently of party considerations. 
Further it should not be suggested that committees will be the arena in which political 
negotiations occur, as that ignores the current structure. MMP will devolve power to parties 
not individual MPs and as such will not allow those MPs, when serving on committees, to 
steer the committees in a direction independent of party control. 
151 Interview with David McGee, above n 48 
152 Ibid. 
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